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WILLEM F. VAN EEKELEN
♠ AND SEBASTIAN KURPAS
* 
ong before the negative Irish referendum took place, European politicians had started to 
look at the opportunities for future action offered by the Treaty of Lisbon. One issue that 
made the headlines concerns a highly sensitive policy area: defence – or rather what is 
called in this post-cold era, the military aspects of security. Although the treaty provisions 
would not challenge the legitimacy of Irish neutrality, they became a major concern during the 
referendum campaign. Especially in view of a possible second Irish referendum, it can therefore 
be expected that defence matters will receive less visibility during the French EU Presidency 
than initially foreseen. Nevertheless, the subject remains topical in view of the likelihood either 
that the Treaty of Lisbon will eventually be ratified, or that we will see a tendency towards 
cooperation outside the EU treaty framework, which would then also probably be inspired by 
‘permanent structured cooperation’ as foreseen by the Treaty.  
The French EU Presidency has floated the idea of a core of the six largest member states 
cooperating on defence issues. The idea as such is not new: already in 2002 the European 
Convention that drafted the discarded Constitutional Treaty proposed the extension of flexible 
forms of integration to the field of military and defence cooperation. The Treaty of Lisbon 
contains several options for creating some degree of flexibility in the defence domain under the 
assumption that it will be difficult, and not always necessary, to do everything at 27: 
constructive abstention, the possibility of mandating a smaller group, or for the most demanding 
missions “permanent structured cooperation in defence” (PSCD). It is further defined in 
Protocol 4 to the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL). It is not yet clear, however, how the conditions of the 
possession of larger military capabilities, and of the will to enter into more binding 
commitments, will be elaborated. Some work might be done during the French Presidency, 
particularly because Germany seems to have rallied to the concept. At a security conference of 
his SPD party, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier even revived the idea of a ‘European 
Army’ starting with a European Air Transport Command, a Council of Defence Ministers and a 
permanent European Defence Academy. Decisions are unlikely before the Treaty of Lisbon has 
been ratified by all member states. Premature action – and talk of a European Army rather than 
European ‘military capabilities’ – might jeopardise the adoption of the treaty. This paper traces 
the debate on flexibility in the area of security and defence and, in particular, addresses PSCD 
and its potential application. 
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So far the efforts to develop European-led military capabilities have not been impressive. The 
Helsinki Headline Goals of 1999 have not been met and their implementation has been 
postponed until 2010 and probably beyond. Ambitions have been lowered to create battlegroups 
of some 1,500 personnel, two of which will be on quick reaction alert every six months. Is this 
all the European Union is able to muster from its combined forces of some million and a half? 
Flexibility as a means for further integration 
Conceptually, ‘flexibility’ is the catch-all term for arrangements that do not include all member 
states. Hard-core, variable geometry, two-speed, à la carte – all are intended to take account of 
differences in integrative capacity or willingness to give up sovereignty concerning matters of 
mutual interest across national borders. Countries always teamed up in the intergovernmental 
sphere outside the treaties and in some important areas like the Schengen agreement their 
arrangements were taken over by the EU only after they had proved to be successful. Flexibility 
was to square the circle between solidarity and effectiveness within the Union framework.
1 
Any form of cooperation between a limited group of members is however bound to raise issues 
of coherence and solidarity within the EU’s larger framework. Those who cannot or will not 
join are likely to feel left out, and those who want to go further in their cooperation or 
integration do not want to be held back by stragglers. In view of the growing membership of the 
European Union, it was assumed that flexible integration would be an inevitable means of 
coping with the contrasting requirements of deepening and widening the Union and that new 
elements of flexibility should be added.
2 Over the years, we have seen several examples of 
limited groupings. The Benelux and the Western European Union already existed before the 
EEC Treaty was concluded; later we saw the emergence of the Schengen agreement for the free 
movement of people and goods and of the eurozone in the monetary field. On the whole, 
however, flexible forms of integration did not take off, primarily because the new members 
insisted on equality of treatment and did their utmost to avoid falling behind, while many of the 
old members kept their own reasons for not wanting to go too far. Moreover, the Council 
managed fairly well in taking decisions by consensus, even when qualified majority voting was 
allowed. In practice, the Council rarely voted and there was little incentive to proceed with 
flexible measures. In the field of security, several members feared a weakening of NATO, a 
sentiment that was shared by the new members from Central Europe, who were more concerned 
with collective defence than with the new tasks of peace enforcement and stabilisation. In fact, 
the old members of NATO were thinking of new tasks for the Alliance while the new members 
gave priority to the old NATO.  
                                                      
1 Flexibility also is used in another sense: the ability to meet, by unanimous decision, an objective of the 
Union when the Treaty itself does not provide the legal basis. In the ToL this flexibility is no longer 
limited to the Internal Market and is extended to all other objectives. Art 354 TFEU replaces Art. 308 
TEU, but Declaration 41 excludes legislation in the field of the CFSP. In this paper, ‘ToL’ will indicate 
the changes made by the Treaty of Lisbon. ‘TEU’ will refer to the final version of the new Treaty on 
European Union (55 articles) and TFEU to the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (358 
articles). In the final versions both treaties have been renumbered; this paper follows the new numbering. 
2 See, for example, Thomas Zehetner, “Flexibility for CFSP/ESDP – Squaring the Circles of Unity and 
Diversity”, UACES European Studies On-Line Essays, University College London, May 2006 
(http://www.uaces.org/E53Zehetner.pdf) and Christian Deubner, Closer Co-operation in Tomorrow’s 
European Union., Occasional Lecture Series, UCLA Center for European and Eurasian Studies, Los 
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1.  EU treaty reform on security and defence matters – An overview of 
developments 
The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice left a mixed heritage on security and defence matters. On 
the one hand Amsterdam had transferred the Petersberg principles of the WEU to the Treaty on 
European Union in its Article J7.2, but without the reference to the contribution to collective 
defence.
3 This was done at the initiative of Finland and Sweden, which at that time did not want 
to be involved in defence against aggression, but were positive about European activities in 
peacekeeping and even in peace-enforcement. On the other hand the treaty mentioned the 
possibility of integrating the WEU in the EU, if the European Council would so decide. Such 
integration was taken a step further by Protocol A, which agreed that the EU and WEU would 
draw up arrangements for enhanced cooperation between them, within a year from the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. This happened soon afterwards at the European Council of 
Cologne in June 1999 when the functions of the WEU were transferred to the EU, but the 
situation was not clarified with respect to the treaties. For that reason, the Netherlands insisted 
in 2000 that the Treaty of Nice should include the formation of the Political and Security 
Committee in its Article 25. 
1. The Treaty of Amsterdam envisaged the possibility of “closer cooperation”, as it was then 
called, in a new Article 5A (to become Article 11 in the consolidated version). Member states 
intending to establish closer cooperation could address a request to the Commission, which 
might submit a proposal to the Council to that effect or inform the states concerned of the 
reasons for not doing so. Authorisation would be granted by the Council acting by a qualified 
majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament. 
Other members would have a right of veto by declaring that, for important and stated reasons of 
national policy, they opposed the authorisation; then a vote should not be taken and the Council 
could, by qualified majority, refer the matter to the European Council. In any case, the scope of 
closer cooperation was limited. It applied only to areas covered by the EC Treaty, but should not 
concern subjects falling within the exclusive competence of the Community; not affect 
Community policies, actions or programmes; not concern the citizenship of the Union or 
discriminate between nationals of member states; remain within the limits of the powers 
conferred upon the Community; and not constitute a discrimination of trade between member 
states or distort the conditions of competition between them. 
2. The Treaty of Nice somewhat facilitated the establishment of enhanced cooperation in the 
future. The number of members required for launching the procedure would no longer be one 
third, but was fixed at eight (the Treaty of Lisbon would raise it to nine) and the scope was 
extended to the CFSP. The right of veto was dropped except for the CFSP area which would 
require a unanimous decision. Military cooperation was specifically excluded from the concept 
of enhanced cooperation. The provisions on triggering the procedure and on future participants 
varied across the three pillars, but were grouped together in Title VII of the Treaty. 
The Treaty of Nice also added new conditions: enhanced cooperation must contribute to 
enhancing the process of integration within the Union and must not undermine the single market 
or the Union’s economic and social cohesion. It must be undertaken only as a last resort, when it 
                                                      
3 The WEU ministerial meeting on the Petersberg principles near Bonn of 19 June 1992 defined WEU 
missions as follows: “Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article V of the 
Washington Treaty and Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU 
member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; 
peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”. Participation 
in specific operations would remain a sovereign decision of member states in accordance with their 
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had been established within the Council that the objectives of such cooperation could not be 
attained within a reasonable period of time by applying the relevant provisions of the treaties. In 
opening up the possibility of enhanced cooperation in the area of the CFSP, the stipulation was 
added that it should be aimed at safeguarding the values and serving the interests of the Union 
as a whole, respect the principles, objectives, general guidelines and the consistency of the 
CFSP, the powers of the European Community and the consistency between all the Union’s 
policies and its external activities. It should relate only to the implementation of a joint action or 
a common position. However, it should not relate to matters having military and defence 
implications. The European Parliament and the other members of the Council should be kept 
fully informed, through the High Representative for the CFSP, of the implementation of the 
enhanced cooperation. 
3. During the European Convention progress was made on several fronts. Its Defence Working 
Group under the able leadership of Commissioner Michel Barnier proposed a number of 
innovations, which by and large were accepted by the Convention, but not without substantial 
debates.
4 The proposals included: 
•  Updating the Petersberg missions to include conflict prevention through early warning 
and confidence and security building measures; joint disarmament operations; military 
advice and assistance in ‘defence outreach’ including democratically accountable armed 
forces; post-conflict stabilisation; and support for the authorities of a non-member country, 
at their request, in combating terrorism. 
•  Giving the High Representative a right of initiative in crisis management, specifying 
the type of operation contemplated and the resources needed, and assigning to him/her the 
responsibility for coordinating the civilian and military aspects of the operation. The setting 
up of a relatively modest fund for financing the preparatory stage was also proposed.  
•  Facilitating flexibility in decision-making and action. The launching of an operation 
should be decided unanimously (with the possibility of constructive abstention), but once 
agreed, the implementation would be left to the participating states. Several members of the 
working group already proposed emulating the example of the Euro by providing a form of 
closer cooperation open to all member states wishing to carry out the most demanding tasks 
and fulfilling the requirements for them to be credible. Conditions for taking part in this 
‘defence eurozone’ would be the presumption that pre-identified forces and command and 
control capabilities would be available, as well as participation in multinational forces with 
integrated command and control capabilities, and other factors such as force preparedness, 
interoperability and deployment capabilities. 
The Convention working group on defence also recommended three clauses concerning 
solidarity: firstly, a clause enabling recourse to all of the Union’s instruments for the protection 
of the civilian population and democratic institutions. Such a clause, originally proposed by 
France and Germany, would not be a collective defence commitment, but apply to threats from 
non-state entities. Secondly, a solidarity and common security clause in an annex to the Treaty 
to identify risks of any sort threatening the Union and the means of dealing with them; such a 
clause might produce a ‘European security and defence union’ that would also contribute to the 
European pillar of NATO. Thirdly, a collective defence clause for those member states wishing 
to share the obligation of the Brussels Treaty, thus bringing to an end the WEU by incorporating 
its major remaining raison d’être into the Union. The proponents argued that this closer type of 
                                                      
4 See Willem van Eekelen, From Words to Deeds. The Continuing Debate on European Security. 
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cooperation on defence would be better within the Treaty on European Union than outside it, 
while the opponents thought that NATO was sufficient for this type of cooperation. 
Commissioner Michel Barnier, chairman of the working group, reported to the plenary that 
there was no consensus in the working group on flexibility in crisis management and collective 
defence, but that a number of members had launched a forceful appeal to go further on these 
issues.
5 He recommended that the Presidium of the Convention reflect on the relationship 
between possible forms of enhanced cooperation, the scope of a defence policy in which all EU 
member states would participate, and the necessary solidarity of all. The working group also 
laid the basis for the European Defence Agency, which was approved by the European Council 
of Thessaloniki in 2003 and lifted out of the Constitutional Treaty for early implementation. 
At the end of the Convention three modalities were envisaged for action in the field of defence 
and security, when not all member states were prepared to implement it together: 
•  The Council could entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group 
of member states in order to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests. This point 
would find its way into the Constitutional treaty in Art. 141 sub 5 and was elaborated in Art. 
III-310. It now figures in Art. 28A sub 3 ToL (renamed Art. 42 sub 3 TEU in the 
consolidated version). 
•  Those member states whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made 
more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding 
missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. This 
point was made in Art. I-41 sub 6 of the Constitutional Treaty and was elaborated in 
Protocol 23. It figures in Art. 28A sub 6 ToL (Art. 42 sub 6 TEU). 
•  A form of enhanced cooperation was supported for mutual defence as long as the European 
Council had not taken the decision to create the common defence envisaged as a possibility 
in the Maastricht Treaty and firmed up somewhat by the subsequent treaties. This figured in 
Art. 40 of the Convention draft and was elaborated in its Art. III-214, which made clear that 
the assistance provided would be without prejudice to the obligations under the North 
Atlantic Treaty. It was changed by the Intergovernmental Conference and took the form of a 
general solidarity clause, which will be discussed later. 
4. In October 2003 an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was opened, for which the draft 
Constitutional Treaty was acknowledged to be “a good basis.”
6 As will be shown here, the draft 
predetermined a large part of the provisions that made it into the Constitutional Treaty and later 
into the Treaty of Lisbon.  
At the beginning of the IGC pressure was building up on the neutral and nonaligned members. 
The draft Constitutional Treaty oozed solidarity all over and it was odd that this was not 
reflected in responding to the most serious threat of all: aggression against a fellow member 
state. Neutral and non-aligned member states were faced with the dilemma of wanting to 
maintain their traditional policy, but also to restrain the others from establishing core groups 
from which they would be excluded. They went public with their opposition in the autumn of 
2003, culminating in a joint letter of the four foreign ministers to the IGC on 5 December stating 
that “provisions containing formal binding security guarantees would be inconsistent with our 
                                                      
5 Doc. CONV 473/02 reporting on the session of 20 December 2002. 
6 Declaration of Rome, CIG 3/03, 6 October 2003, retrievable at: 
http://ue.eu.int/igcpdf/en/03/cg00/cg00003.en03.pdf. 6 | VAN EEKELEN & KURPAS 
security policy or with our constitutional requirements”.
7 They suggested a rather one-sided and 
non-committal formula: 
If a Member State is victim of armed aggression, it may request that the other Member 
States give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military and other, in 
accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
The Italian Presidency tried several formulas in the run-up to the European Council in 
December 2003. The articles enabling enhanced cooperation for common defence were deleted. 
In their place came a general solidarity clause without any procedural follow-up on how it could 
be implemented. In the end, the draft Constitutional Treaty contained two different solidarity 
clauses.
8 
The first one was the easiest and concerned mutual support in cases of a terrorist attack or 
natural or man-made disaster. In the Treaty of Lisbon it has become Title VII Solidarity Clause 
with its sole article 188R (Art. 222 TFEU in the consolidated version). See Box 1. 
Box 1. Treaty of Lisbon, Title VII Solidarity Clause 
1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a member state is 
the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall 
mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the 
Member States, to: 
(a)  - prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; 
- protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; 
- assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event 
  of a terrorist attack; 
(b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a 
natural or man-made disaster. 
2. Should a Member State be the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-
made disaster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities. To 
that end, the Member States shall coordinate between themselves in the Council. 
3. The arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause shall be defined 
by a decision adopted by the Council acting on a joint proposal by the Commission and the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The Council shall act in 
accordance with Article 15b(1) of the Treaty on European Union where this decision has defence 
implications. The European Parliament shall be informed.* 
___________________________ 
* Article 15b was inserted in the Common Provisions on the CFSP, with the text of the earlier Article 
23 but with the amendment that decisions under this chapter shall be taken by the European Council 
and the Council acting unanimously, except where this chapter provides otherwise. For adoption of a 
unanimous decision, abstention is allowed by less than one third of the member states. In the version 
consolidated by the ToL it will become Art. 31 TEU. 
This solidarity clause is a curious mixture of considerations. It refers to the mobilisation of all 
instruments at the disposal of the Union, including military instruments made available by 
                                                      
7 See van Eekelen, op.cit., pp.169-171 and doc. CIG 62/03 of 5 December 2003. 
8 The word ‘solidarity’ also appears elsewhere in the treaties, e.g. as a general principle in the preamble to 
the ToL, para. 5, and in Art.3.3 in relation to economic, social and territorial cohesion, and in Art, 3.5 in 
terms of solidarity and mutual respect between the peoples, and more specifically on energy in Art. 122 
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member states, but in case of a terrorist attack, coordination will take place between themselves 
in the Council. There is neither a reference to the High Representative nor to the Commission. 
Yet, the future arrangements for implementation will be proposed jointly by the High 
Representative and the Commission. Presumably on this issue, which relates both to external 
and internal security and requires contacts between the military, intelligence services, police and 
local government, the precise competences of the President of the Commission and the other 
Commissioners still have to be worked out. 
The second solidarity clause, relating to assistance in case of attack on a member state, is hidden 
in paragraph 7 of Article 28A ToL (Art. 42 TEU) in the section dealing with provisions on the 
Common Security and Defence Policy.  
Box 2. Second solidarity clause in the Treaty of Lisbon 
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States 
shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in 
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific 
character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.  
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the 
foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.* 
_________________________ 
* The Lisbon Treaty no longer talks of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), but of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). After stating that the CSDP shall include the 
progressive framing of a common Union defence policy”(which will lead to a common defence, when 
the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides) Article 42 sub 2 contained a similar caveat to 
that sub 7, regarding the specific policy of certain member states and the NATO obligations of others 
“which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under 
the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established 
within that framework”. Two almost identical references within the same article illustrated the delicate 
character of EU-NATO relations. It remains odd, however, to refer to two common security and 
defence policies within the same paragraph. 
This wording comes close to the Articles V of WEU and NATO, but is less specific by avoiding 
the words “military assistance”. The WEU Article V also refers to Article 51 of the UN Charter 
– the inherent right of self-defence, individually and collectively – but amounts to an automatic 
military assistance clause by stating the obligation as to “afford the party so attacked all the 
military and other aid and assistance in their power”. In NATO Article V of the Washington 
Treaty makes the assistance more discretionary by agreeing, in case of armed attack, to take 
forthwith “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force”. 
More puzzling is the ambiguity between the second and the first sentence. To what extent could 
a specific security and defence policy derogate from the obligation of rendering aid and 
assistance “by all the means in their power”? Or more specifically, could a country say: “We 
have the obligation, but no power to implement it”? The best explanation, though not explicitly 
used, would be that the obligation remains, but the way of implementing it might be different. 
The neutral/non-aligned would have a bilateral obligation towards their attacked partner, while 
the others would act through NATO or through the permanent structured cooperation that might 
exist at that point in time. In any case, this answer would let Austria off the hook, for that 
country has a constitutional impediment against joining a military alliance. More important is 
the fact that mutual assistance has become binding for all and is no longer an instrument of 
flexible cooperation. Some British authors have argued that collective defence has become a 8 | VAN EEKELEN & KURPAS 
peripheral issue, but then they underestimate the anxieties of the new members as a result of 
renewed Russian assertiveness.
9 
The question was not pursued further, because nobody wanted to complicate the national 
ratification procedures of the Constitutional Treaty. Instead, attention shifted towards more 
practical matters, like the formation of ‘battle-groups’. 
Box 3. Battle-groups 
That new concept followed the example of the autonomous EU operation Artemis in Bunia 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo) in 2004 where a force of some 1800 personnel had managed 
to stabilise the situation until a much larger UN force could be present three months later. It was 
the last phase of a process of leapfrogging between NATO and the EU. In 1999 the EU had 
formulated the Helsinki Headline Goal of 50-60,000 persons, available within 60 days and 
sustainable for a year. NATO responded with the NATO Response Force (NRF) as proposed by 
the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld for a tri-service insertion force of 21,000 personnel 
(later expanded to 25,000) with real combat capabilities and available within weeks, but with a 
limited sustainability of 120 days.
10 The EU had difficulty in meeting the Helsinki Headline Goals 
and postponed their realisation to 2010. The short-term level of ambition was downsized to a 
battle-group that would consist of some 1,500 men, with limited multinationality (varying 
between one and four participants) and deployable in 5 days after the political decision was taken 
to launch the operation. At any time two battle-groups would be on quick alert. The timeline was 
extremely short, because the decision-making process required several steps* to be taken. 
__________________________ 
* First, there is the approval of a Council Crisis Management Concept, followed by the definition of 
Military Strategic Options (MSO), and then the selection of one MSO as the basis for an Initiating 
Military Directive for the Operation Commander, thus triggering the operational planning phase and 
the development of a concept of operations (CONOPS) and an Operational Plan (OPLAN). Once the 
latter has been approved, a status of forces agreement signed and military units provided by the 
member states, the Council takes the final decision to launch the operation (see Trevor Salmon, “The 
European Union: Just an Alliance or a Military Alliance?”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 
5, October 2006, p.  837.) In the case of Artemis, this process took less than three weeks. 
It was tempting to describe the battle-groups as a form of permanent structured cooperation. 
They constituted operationally useful units, though of modest proportions, and almost all 
member states took part. Yet, several questions remained: Did their military capabilities really 
fulfil higher criteria and who would define those? Was this a case of more binding commitments 
towards each other and were they organised with a view to the most demanding missions? 
Those questions are difficult to answer, because the battle-groups have not yet been used in the 
field. To a certain extent, they suffer from the same shortage of operational units as the NRF, 
which raises the question of whether the EU and NATO should keep forces in reserve for 
uncertain future missions while they have great difficulties in mounting sufficient forces for 
ongoing operations, as is currently the case in Afghanistan. Equally important is the question of 
                                                      
9 See, for example, Simon Duke, The Convention, the draft Constitution and External Relations: Effects 
and Implications for the EU and its International Role, Working Paper 2003/W/2, EIPA, Maastricht. 
Jolyon Howorth took a relaxed view in his article “The European Draft Constitutional Treaty and the 
Future of the European Defence Initiative”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. l9 (2004) pp. 483-
508, and regarded the clause as “common sense recognition that all will do what they can …” 
10 The NRF was built up rapidly and established a rotation schedule. It was used in assisting Pakistan after 
a large earthquake, but was not yet deployed for more military purposes. At a time in which the Allies 
found it difficult to muster enough troops for Afghanistan, it made little sense to hold forces in reserve for 
contingencies which might never arise. THE EVOLUTION OF FLEXIBLE INTEGRATION IN EUROPEAN DEFENCE POLICY | 9 
whether forces of this limited size will ever be able to carry out the most demanding missions. 
And what would be their relationship with the existing multinational formations like the 
Eurocorps and, in future, with the formations available under the revised Helsinki Headline 
Goals? Moreover, it is still unclear whether, and if so how, the two battle-groups on guard will 
be able to operate together, or whether they are intended for two different missions at the same 
time. 
5. Like the Convention draft and the Constitutional Treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon stipulates that 
“Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities” (Art. 28A 
sub 3 ToL, Art. 42 sub 3 TEU). In spite of the strange place of the word “progressively” linking 
it to “undertake” rather than to “improve”, this obligation applies to all members, but their speed 
of implementation will vary. The remainder of the article defines the European Defence Agency 
(EDA) as the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and 
armaments, with the tasks:  
•  to identify operational requirements,  
•  to promote measures to satisfy them,  
•  to contribute to strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector,  
•  to participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and  
•  to assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities. 
Conceptually, this combination of tasks, from requirements to R&D, production, procurement 
and ultimately evaluation, was a breakthrough. In practice, much remains to be desired, but at 
least the EDA managed to make the European defence equipment market more transparent. 
Being basically a ‘capabilities agency’, it would be well-placed to assist in judging the 
qualifications of a member country for joining the permanent structured cooperation and, 
subsequently, progress made in meeting the criteria. 
The EDA potentially provides an important link with the non-EU members of NATO. Norway 
and Turkey were members of its predecessor, the Western European Armaments Group 
(WEAG), under the Maastricht formula so that they could “fully participate in the activities” of 
the WEU. So far Turkish participation in EDA has been blocked by Cyprus. The only place 
where the “full participation” still applies is the WEU Assembly in Paris.
11 
2.  Perspectives of flexibility in the area of security and defence 
Among the new possibilities for a flexible approach in defence and security the option of Art. 
28 C ToL (Art. 44 TEU) of entrusting a group of member states with an operational task would 
be the easiest to implement. In fact, it codifies what is happening already, as it is not necessary 
for all members to participate in every operation and interest in a particular mission is likely to 
vary. The article allows the participants, in association with the High Representative (HR), to 
agree among themselves on the management of the task. They will keep the Council regularly 
informed of the conduct of the operation and particularly of circumstances requiring amendment 
of the objective, scope and conditions of the mission. Presumably the HR will be their main 
channel for doing so. 
Enhanced cooperation in CFSP is not likely to be widely used. In the first place, this is because 
– in the words of Andrew Duff in the European Convention – the provisions are “still hardly a 
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model of lucidity” and their very existence runs counter to the Convention’s drive towards a 
simplification of the decision-making procedures. A second reason is the specificity of foreign 
affairs. This policy area has little legislation and most capitals prefer to act by consensus, 
particularly because those staying out will not be bound by the actions adopted in this 
framework. Thirdly, as we have seen, starting enhanced cooperation within CFSP will need a 
unanimous decision of the Council. At best, this type of flexibility might be used as a deterrent 
against obstruction in the Council, by showing that in the absence of a consensus other avenues 
will be explored, if necessary outside the treaty. Yet, foreign and security policies also entail a 
flexible approach almost by nature: interests vary and the degree of urgency varies accordingly. 
The decision to take action outside our own territory will always be selective, which makes it 
preferable to devise procedures among all 27 member states which allow for action by those 
who are prepared to become engaged and for an abstention by those reluctant to join but not 
wishing to prevent the others from going ahead. In this context it is interesting to note that 
during the Kosovo crisis in February 2008 the option of “constructive abstention” was used for 
the first time ever. Cyprus abstained on the Joint Actions appointing Mr. Pieter Feith as EU 
Special Representative in Kosovo and concurrently head of the new International Civilian 
Office in Kosovo, and on establishing the ESDP mission of police and judicial experts. 
At the intergovernmental level we have seen several examples of groupings outside the treaty. 
The Contact Groups for Bosnia (made up of France, Germany, the UK, the US and Russia) and 
for Kosovo (where Italy managed to join after considerable diplomatic pressure) are examples 
of a growing role of the ‘Big Three’, much to the chagrin of Poland, Spain and (in the case of 
Bosnia) Italy. The same three large countries played a role in dealing with Iran on nuclear non-
proliferation. Leadership of the Franco-German ‘axis’, which had played such an important role 
in the past for moving European integration ahead, was no longer the traditional engine, largely 
because it was rejected as such by the new members. On the other hand, when the three largest 
countries with their different views of the preferred future are in agreement, the chance of 
consensus among all 27 would be substantial and the need for special arrangements much less. 
Finally, in spite of serious differences over the Iraq war and on the battle over the Constitutional 
Treaty, progress in CFSP/ESDP on other matters was hardly impeded. One has to agree with 
Thomas Zehetner when he points to the lack of study of the role of ‘clubs’ in European affairs 
and the need for leadership if the EU is to become an action-oriented organisation.
12 Here the 
enhanced role of the High Representative will be crucial, because at the intergovernmental level 
initiative and leadership are bound to be weak. 
Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence Matters (PSCD) is different from enhanced 
cooperation in scope and intensity. It has been predetermined and blessed in advance for two 
specific purposes, one military and one political:  
-  mounting military capabilities and  
-  permanent commitments of the participants towards each other.  
Its implementation is governed by Art. 28 E ToL (Art. 46 TEU) and Protocol 4 (see Box 4). As 
already mentioned, it differs from enhanced cooperation, as participation is not only a question 
of political commitment, but also of meeting certain objective criteria. Another difference is the 
possibility to start PSCD by qualified majority. According to the treaty, those member states 
wishing to participate and meeting the criteria shall notify their intention to the Council and to 
the High Representative, upon which the Council will within three months adopt (by qualified 
majority and having consulted the High Representative) a decision establishing PSCD and 
determining the list of participants. Later adherents follow the same procedure, but then only the 
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participating members vote, again by qualified majority, on their accession. If a country no 
longer fulfils the criteria, the Council may adopt a decision to suspend its participation. Other 
decisions have to be taken by unanimity of the participating members.  
The wording of Protocol 4 shows again that member states were at pains to avoid any 
inconsistency with NATO obligations. Its preamble even states that “a more assertive Union 
role in security and defence matters will contribute to the vitality of a renewed Atlantic 
Alliance, in accordance with the Berlin Plus arrangements”.
13 It also refers to the possibility of 
UN requests for the urgent implementation of missions under chapters VI and VII of the 
Charter.  
Box 4. Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation, Article 1-3 
Article 1 
The permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 28 A(6) of the Treaty on European 
Union shall be open to any Member State which undertakes, from the date of entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, to: 
(a) proceed more intensively to develop its defence capacities through the development of its 
national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main 
European equipment programmes, and in the activity of the Agency in the field of defence 
capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency), and 
(b) have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the latest, either at national level or as a component of 
multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a 
tactical level as a battle group, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable 
of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 28 B of the Treaty on European Union, within a 
period of 5 to 30 days, in particular in response to requests from the United Nations 
Organisation, and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be extended up to 
at least 120 days. 
Article 2 
To achieve the objectives laid down in Article 1, Member States participating in permanent 
structured cooperation shall undertake to: 
(a) cooperate, as from the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a view to achieving 
approved objectives concerning the level of investment expenditure on defence equipment, and 
regularly review these objectives, in the light of the security environment and of the Union's 
international responsibilities; 
(b) bring their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible, particularly by 
harmonising the identification of their military needs, by pooling and, where appropriate, 
specialising their defence means and capabilities, and by encouraging cooperation in the fields of 
training and logistics; 
(c) take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and 
deployability of their forces, in particular by identifying common objectives regarding the 
commitment of forces, including possibly reviewing their national decision-making procedures; 
(d) work together to ensure that they take the necessary measures to make good, including 
through multinational approaches, and without prejudice to undertakings in this regard within the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the shortfalls perceived in the framework of the ‘Capability 
Development Mechanism’; 
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(e) take part, where appropriate, in the development of major joint or European equipment 
programmes in the framework of the European Defence Agency. 
Article 3 
The European Defence Agency shall contribute to the regular assessment of participating 
Member States' contributions with regard to capabilities, in particular contributions made in 
accordance with the criteria to be established, inter alia, on the basis of Article 2, and shall 
report thereon at least once a year. The assessment may serve as a basis for Council 
recommendations and decisions adopted in accordance with Article 28 E of the Treaty on 
European Union.  
Source: C 306/154 EN Official Journal of the European Union 17.12.2007. 
In itself, the list of criteria for participation in PSCD was impressive, but as so often, it risked 
being too large. Most member states could argue that they meet some of them, but hardly any 
would meet them all. Much attention was paid to the battle-groups, but it remains unclear 
whether they could be the standard for being eligible for PSCD. Battle-groups are small and 
intended for a short deployment. Will they be sufficient for undertaking the most demanding 
missions? Yet, if they are the model, almost all member states could qualify. Similar problems 
arise with participation in EDA. The Agency by now has a fairly good idea of available 
capabilities, but there are very few collaborative programmes for research and development. In 
fact, there are fewer projects and less money available than under the Western European 
Armaments Group which preceded the EDA. The notion of periodic evaluation is a good one, 
but will function only if progress can be measured against agreed requirements. Here NATO 
experience with a force planning cycle, including guidance, force proposals and national plans 
coming together, is far superior to the loose and voluntaristic way CFSP and ESDP have 
developed so far. 
It also remains unclear how the political condition of more binding commitments should be 
measured. It appears ironic that after first deconstructing the Western European Union (WEU), 
which was creating ‘Forces answerable to the WEU’ (FAWEU), we now seem to be doing 
something similar, possibly with only a slightly larger group of countries, but admittedly with a 
better link to the procurement side. Antonio Missiroli estimated that, with the exception of 
France and the UK, hardly any country would qualify as a top performer in each and every 
functional area mentioned in the Protocol. Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden 
would probably meet many of the criteria, while others – e.g. Poland, Slovakia, Belgium and 
Portugal – may well be driven by the political incentives to raise their capabilities to an 
adequate level.
14  
A proposal recently put forward by French MP Pierre Lellouche includes a list of eight rather 
ambitious criteria that would make a country qualify for PSCD:
15 
1. To start PSCD, obligatory participation of the largest six member states (France, 
Germany, Italy Poland, Spain, UK) as a hard core is regarded as necessary to give the policy 
credibility. Other members should however be able to join the group at any time. 
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2. Each participating country would have to spend at least 2% of its GDP on defence. This is 
clearly not the case for Germany and Spain today and other countries would also struggle to 
meet this criterion. Public support for substantial increases in the defence budget would be very 
difficult to obtain in some member states and objectively hard to justify. Moreover, it is more 
important to judge the quality of the defence effort than the money spent on it. 
3. Members of the group would have to abandon the current exception on military matters 
to the common market (Art. 296 TEC). In contrast to today’s provisions the participating 
countries would have to create a real common market for defence that would give preference to 
the European armaments industry. 
4. Members would agree to the creation of an intervention force under common command 
of 60,000 troops to which each of the large member states should contribute 10,000. This 
criterion rightly focuses on the original Helsinki Headline goals for European capabilities and 
substantially exceeds the minimalistic battlegroup concept. But what about the smaller countries 
willing to join? 
5. Participating countries would have to ‘Europeanise’ their foreign military bases. This 
criterion is applicable to France and the UK. 
6. Common infrastructure programmes on important issues (space, communication and 
information, antimissile defence) should be pursued jointly. Presumably these would be in 
addition to the EDA activities, which are not included in Lellouces’s requirements. 
7. A common plan to protect the population in case of terrorist attacks with non-
conventional arms (chemicals, bacteriological or nuclear) should be initiated. 
8. Participating countries should agree on a common European disarmament and arms 
control policy. This should include the reduction of nuclear arms, security garanties, the 
creation of a European Bank for nuclear fuel, for emerging countries interested in obtaining 
electronuclear capacities for civil use.  
Concluding remarks 
By and large flexibility on defence matters did not get very far. Some areas of flexible 
cooperation did start outside the treaties and subsequently were incorporated into them, 
occasionally with an opt-out for individual member states. One could say that on the whole 
member states preferred inactivity to a divided Union. In the past this has not been catastrophic, 
because NATO provided an alternative to action, at least as long as the US was prepared to 
provide leadership. Increasingly, however, the EU will have to improve the coherence of its 
instruments and policies if it is to become the kind of global player to which its 500 million 
citizens would entitle it. 
The understandable focus of the French suggestions on large member states highlights a 
problem that ambitious criteria create for those small countries that have the political will to 
join, but will not be able to muster sufficient capabilities to qualify. For example, the question 
of what kind of participation in a battle-group would be sufficient for smaller member states 
needs to be clarified. Possibly they could contribute in concert with neighbouring countries, as 
in the case of the Baltic battalion. This would mean, however, that almost every country would 
qualify. If criteria are to be more ambitious, counterproductive effects have to be kept in mind. 
Smaller countries should not be driven towards passiveness due to criteria according to which 
they would hardly ever qualify. If participation in PSCD is de facto left to larger member states, 
it would not only put the entire burden on them, but also seriously undermine the logic of 
traditional European integration, where each member state is given the perspective of being part 
of all initiatives. 14 | VAN EEKELEN & KURPAS 
Finally, the future of PSCD will depend on the vigour with which its initial proponent, France, 
will pursue the concept. It remains to be seen how it will match with the much talked about 
return of France into the integrated military structure of NATO, and with the mollified attitude 
that President Bush showed at the April summit of NATO in Bucharest towards European 
defence cooperation and autonomous operations. In the past, talk about forms of enhanced 
cooperation was often intended to activate the stragglers. Today, it is not quite clear what they 
should do to avoid being left behind. Recently, the French State Secretary for European Affairs 
Jean Pierre Jouyet struck a reassuring note by saying that France “would start the debate on the 
conditions for its implementation”, but that in any event these provisions would not be 
implemented before 2009. In a speech before the WEU Assembly he wanted to promote a 
“broad, inclusive approach taking forward as many Europeans as possible” and added that 
“permanent structured cooperation must not serve to create an ESDP elite. No one must be 
excluded.”
16 
So far much of the discussion has focused on capabilities, and this in the context of battle-
groups. Even if taken together these do not constitute great assets. Moreover, the difference 
between larger and smaller countries almost disappears when the most substantial contribution 
is not much more than a reinforced battalion. That is also the level below which an infantry 
contribution should not be multi-national if it is to be militarily effective; specific contributions 
could be provided at a lower level. It would be more significant if PSCD could be developed in 
the perspective of the currently almost dormant Headline Goals 2010, which aim at 50-60,000 
personnel available for a year and have a three-service character. 
More important would be the question of what the political criteria of “more binding 
commitments towards each other” should include. Clearly, commitments will have to be pre-
identified before specific operations are discussed. A first step should be agreement on the tasks 
countries want to perform together and on the inventory needed for their execution. More 
precisely, what are the “most demanding missions” of combat forces in crisis management, 
which seem to be our objective? A European White Book on European strategy, requirements, 
planning, organisation and procurement is long overdue, albeit difficult to draft. 
For many countries it will be difficult to meet all capability criteria from the start and there 
should be a multi-annual target for reaching and evaluating them. Pooling resources would seem 
to be indicated, but so far countries have defined their defence plans with little attention as to 
what their partners are doing. Sven Biscop is right in asking what the phrase in the European 
Security Strategy about “share responsibility for global security” means if we have no common 
approach towards our planning assumptions for the number of forces trained for crisis 
management, long-term peacekeeping and territorial defence and of reserve personnel.
17 
Some progress has been made, but it is rather fragmented. While NATO and the UN have no 
concept for security sector reform, which is a key element in the increasingly recognised link 
between security and development, the EU even has two, one from the Council and one from 
the European Commission. The EU police contribution in Afghanistan is subject to severe 
criticism. Much remains to be done. The implementation of the forthcoming double-hatting of 
the High Representative/Vice President of the Commission and the formation of an External 
Action Service will be the first priority. But a more effective mobilisation of our numerous but 
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scattered military capabilities will be essential for a credible role in an unpredictable world. The 
forthcoming debate on Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence faces the difficult task of 
squaring the circle between effectiveness and solidarity, which is bound to be divisive. But it is 
worth conducting nevertheless.  About CEPS
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